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Abstract 
Following the neopatrimonialism paradigm, it can be hypothesised that in African states 
informal politics of the rulers infringe on the collection of taxes and in turn reduce state 
revenues. This article tests this proposition for the case of Zambia. The main finding is that 
there is no linear correlation between a neopatrimonial system and the collection of taxes. 
Neopatrimonial continuity in the country is evidenced by three factors; the concentration 
of political power, the award of personal favours and the misuse of state resources. De-
spite this continuity, the revenue performance has increased considerably with the crea-
tion of the semi-autonomous Zambia Revenue Authority. This demonstrates that the effect 
of neopatrimonialism on public policy in the African state is highly context-specific and 
dependent on the interaction with additional variables. Donor pressure has been the most 
important in the Zambian case. In order to apply neopatrimonialism for further empirical 
work on public policy in the African state, these additional variables have to be incorpo-
rated into the analysis. 
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Wie beeinflusst Neopatrimonialismus den afrikanischen Staat? Die Steuererhebung in 
Zambia 
Ausgehend vom Konzept des Neopatrimonialismus kann vermutet werden, dass in afri-
kanischen Staaten informelle Politiken der Herrscher die Erhebung von Steuern beein-
trächtigen und damit die Einnahmen des Staates vermindern. Der vorliegende Artikel 
testet diese Hypothese am Beispiel von Zambia. Das Hauptergebnis ist, dass kein linearer 
Zusammenhang zwischen einem neopatrimonialen System und dem Erheben von Steuern 
besteht. Trotz neopatrimonialer Kontinuität, nachgewiesen durch die drei Variablen Kon-
zentration politischer Macht, Verteilen persönlicher Gefälligkeiten und Missbrauch von 
staatlichen Ressourcen, hat die Schaffung der halb unabhängigen Zambia Revenue Autho-
rity zu einer beträchtlichen Steigerung der staatlichen Einnahmen geführt. Dies zeigt, dass 
der Effekt von Neopatrimonialismus auf bestimmte Politikfelder des afrikanischen Staates 
in höchstem Maße Kontext-spezifisch und abhängig von zusätzlichen Variablen ist. Die 
wichtigste im zambischen Fall ist der Einfluss von Gebern. Um Neopatrimonialismus für 
die empirische Arbeit zu public policy in afrikanischen Staaten anzuwenden, müssen diese 
zusätzlichen Variablen in der Analyse berücksichtigt werden. How Does Neopatrimonialism Affect the African State? 
The Case of Tax Collection in Zambia 
Christian von Soest1
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1. Introduction 
Proponents of the concept of neopatrimonialism assert that distinct features distinguish 
governance in the African state from its counterparts in other world regions (Médard 1982; 
Bratton/van de Walle 1997; Chabal/Daloz 1999; Englebert 2000; van de Walle 2001b). The 
particular nature of the African state, characterised by the lack of separation between the 
public and the private sphere, is found as fundamentally inhibiting state capability on the 
continent. 
                                                      
1   The empirical results presented in this article emanate from the author’s PhD on ‘The African State 
and the Capability to Raise Revenue. A Comparative Study on the Tax Administration in Zambia 
and Botswana’, submitted to the University of Leipzig. The author is indebted to Ulf Engel, Mat-
thias Basedau and Gero Erdmann, who all provided invaluable support and advice to his research 
project. Field work was financed by a scholarship from the German Academic Exchange Service 
(DAAD). 6  von Soest: How Does Neopatrimonialism Affect the African State? 
The inability to collect taxes2, which commonly form the financial basis for all other state 
functions (e.g. internal and external security, public welfare), is one of the most fundamental 
deficits in this respect (van de Walle 2001b: 182-183; Bräutigam 2002: 14; Olowu 2003: 105). 
An IMF study (1997: 6-7) found that in some African countries more than 60% of the tax po-
tential remains untapped. As a consequence, hardly any of the African states is financially 
self-sufficient. The continent today is the most donor-dependent region in the world (World 
Bank Africa Database 2005). The perspective of neopatrimonialism implies that this cannot 
only be attributed to Africa’s low socio-economic status, but also to political interference 
with the process of collecting state revenues. It is this premise this article will test in respect 
to Zambia, a country whose political practice – similar to other African states – is assumed to 
be characterised by neopatrimonialism.3
Since colonial times, Zambia’s state finances have been based on the extraction of copper. 
The sharp decline of world market prices for the mineral resource in the mid-1970s caused a 
severe revenue and economic crisis. In 2000 real GDP per capita had declined to only about 
55% of its 1975 level (World Bank 2003: 112). Up to the 2005 Heavily Indebted Poor Coun-
tries (HIPC) debt relief, Zambia had been one of the most-heavily indebted countries in sub-
Saharan Africa (IMF 2005a). Despite the need for new sources of state income, the single-
party government of President Kaunda refrained from strengthening domestic tax collec-
tion. 
Only after the reintroduction of the multi-party system in 1991 and the electoral success of 
the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), the new government radically strength-
ened domestic revenue generation. Yet, the indicators show that Zambia’s political elite has 
resorted to neopatrimonial practices largely unabatedly. The country therefore constitutes a 
particular interesting case study for analysing neopatrimonialism and its effects on the col-
lection of state revenue. 
Empirically, over 75 qualitative interviews conducted in Zambia allow for ‘process tracing’ 
and provide most of this study’s empirical value added. Six respondent groups from inside 
as well as outside the tax administration were interviewed.4 The respondents were tax offi-
cers from a) the management and from b) middle/low hierarchy levels, business persons, 
civil society representatives, politicians and political decision makers, social scientists and 
employees from international organisations. In addition, primary sources such as the tax 
administration’s annual reports and the budget speeches were systematically analysed. 
                                                      
2   In this article, the terms ‘taxes’ or ‘revenue’ encompass income taxes, value-added taxes and cus-
toms duties.  
3   Posner and Simon (2002: 331) portray Zambia as a ‘modal case’ in the African context.  
4   Field work was conducted from 4 March to 27 May 2004. Research permission granted by the 
Zambia Revenue Authority is greatly acknowledged. von Soest: How Does Neopatrimonialism Affect the African State?  7 
The article starts by conceptualising the main facets of neopatrimonialism. It then sets out to 
operationalise and analyse neopatrimonialism in Zambia with the indicators introduced. In 
the third step the article assesses the effects of neopatrimonialism on the collection of reve-
nue. The main finding is that the relationship between neopatrimonialism and central tax 
collection is highly context-specific and dependent upon the specific interaction with other 
variables. As will be outlined in the conclusion, there is need to also take into account these 
intervening variables, in this case particularly donor influence, in order to apply neopatri-
monialism for analysing political practice in the African state. 
 
 
2. Conceptualising Neopatrimonialism 
Neopatrimonialism is a ‘universal concept’ which its proponents perceive to have particular 
value for explaining Africa’s state weaknesses, democratic deficiencies and economic crisis. 
Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 277) for instance maintain that ‘the distinctive institutional 
hallmark of African regimes is neopatrimonialism’. The basic proposition of the heuristic 
concept is that informal, particularistic politics of the rulers pervade formal state institu-
tions. The separation between the public and the private realm, which stands at the basis of 
the ‘modern’ conception of the state, is abrogated.5
Principally, the term neopatrimonialism denotes the simultaneous operation of the two We-
berian ideal types of patrimonial and rational-legal domination (Clapham 1985: 48; Brat-
ton/van de Walle 1997: 62). Patrimonialism connotes that a patron in a certain social and 
political order bestows gifts from own resources on followers in order to secure their loyalty 
and support (Weber 1980 [1922]: 133-134, 136). Clients, in turn, obtain material benefits and 
protection. In a neopatrimonial system, patrons typically are office-holders in state institu-
tions who misuse public funds or office in order to stay in power. Social practice as a result 
is fundamentally different compared to the impersonal formal rules which are supposed to 
guide official action (Erdmann/Engel 2006: 18; Alence 2004: 165). 
Taking the case of tax collection, it can be hypothesised that neopatrimonialism leads to po-
litical interference6 with the tax administration and in turn reduces state revenue. Donors as 
well as scientists regard these organisations as focal points of interference from the political 
sphere (World Bank 2002: 111; Gill 2003: 1; Rose-Ackerman 2004: 28). Two prime ways of 
undue influence from the political sphere are possible: First, the placement of unqualified 
top-, middle- and low-level tax officers, which fill patronage positions. Second, neopatrimo-
                                                      
5   For an extensive discussion of the neopatrimonialism concept see Erdmann/Engel (2006). 
6   This article understands every policy or political action which violates the rational-legal logic of 
the tax administration and the administrative chain of command as ‘interference’. 8  von Soest: How Does Neopatrimonialism Affect the African State? 
nial interference with the tax administration’s day-to-day business in order to prevent audits 
at businesses that enjoy political protection, to inhibit controls at border posts and to harass 
opponents of the neopatrimonial ‘big man’. Both strategies serve the political interest of se-
curing authority and the private interest of reducing tax payments. They keep the tax ad-
ministration weak and in turn significantly reduce the room for self-sufficiently financing 
the African state. 
Reading the vast array of literature on neopatrimonialism in sub-Saharan Africa, it is strik-
ing that widely accepted indicators for this political practice are inexistent and that system-
atic analyses of its effects on public policy are rare (one exception is Kjaer 2004). The key 
methodological aim of this article therefore is to contribute to the systematic operationalisa-
tion of the concept. In accordance to Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 63-68), it applies the 
three features ‘systematic concentration of political power’, ‘award of personal favours’ and 
‘use of state resources for political legitimation’ for assessing the neopatrimonial profile of 
Zambia. Such analysis provides strong indications about the character of the Zambian state 
and will reveal the strong continuity of neopatrimonial practices in the country. 
 
 
3. Neopatrimonialism in Zambia 
Since independence, Zambia’s rulers have consistently applied all three features of neopat-
rimonial politics. 
 
Concentration of Political Power 
The first facet, the systematic concentration of political power, implies the dominance of one 
individual, ‘who resists delegating all but the most trivial decision-making tasks’ (Bratton/ 
van de Walle 1997: 63).7 As a defining feature of this ‘big man politics’, the president or, in 
other words, the patron, stays in power for a long time, sometimes until the end of his life. 
Indeed, presidents in sub-Saharan Africa on average officiate significantly longer than their 
counterparts in Asia and Latin America (Bienen/van de Walle 1992: 693). Young speaks of 
‘“life president” power management’ (1994: preface on x). On the other hand, neopatrimo-
nial rulers frequently rotate the political elite in order to prevent any potential opponent 
from developing his or her own power base and also in order to extend the clientelist net-
                                                      
7   Bratton and van de Walle term this feature ‘presidentialism’. However, this is misleading as the 
traditional political science definition of presidentialism refers to political systems in which the 
president is directly elected by the electorate, exerts the executive power and cannot be deselected 
by parliament (in contrast to parliamentary systems). This article therefore refers to the phenome-
non in question as ‘concentration of political power’.  von Soest: How Does Neopatrimonialism Affect the African State?  9 
work (Snyder/Mahoney 1999: 108-109; Snyder 1992: 392). The simultaneous fulfilment of 
both requirements, a long tenure of presidents and a short tenure of key government mem-
bers, therefore suggests a neopatrimonial power concentration. 
This has exactly been the case in Zambia. With Kenneth Kaunda, Frederick Chiluba and 
Levy Mwanawasa, the country has only seen three Presidents since independence in 1964. 
Their average length of tenure amounts to 14 years8, which stands above the 11.6 years Afri-
can state leaders have on average managed to stay in power from 1980 to 2005 (van de Walle 
2005: 74). 
The first President Kaunda served for 27 years in office and entrenched his power with a 
corps of personal advisors which in turn reduced the influence of the cabinet and other units 
of the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP). He not only gained from particu-
lar legitimacy as Zambia’s founding President who had led the struggle for independence 
but also augmented his control of the political process by promulgating the one-party state 
in December 1972 (Tordoff/Molteno 1974: 252; Scott 1980: 152). 
The neopatrimonial centralisation of power in Zambia also finds expression in the frequent 
change of ministers. The average tenure of key ministers from independence until today 
stands at only 2.4 years.9 Consequently, the most important cabinet members have exercised 
their functions for only half of a legislative period on average. This pattern of ‘elite circula-
tion’ (Burnell 2001b: 241) has shown a high degree of consistency and has endured during 
Zambia’s one-party Second Republic (from end of 1972 to 1991) and during the multi-party 
Third Republic (since November 1991). 
In a major cabinet reshuffle in April 1993 for instance, President Chiluba removed those re-
form-minded ministers he perceived to be a threat to his rule from office. Others were frus-
trated to the extent that they resigned from government (Erdmann/Simutanyi 2003: 14). 
With an average tenure of less than two years, the ‘ministerial game of musical chairs’ 
                                                      
8   Article 35 (2) of the 1991/1996 Constitution (Republic of Zambia 2004) restricts the tenure of office 
of the President to the maximum of two five-year terms. Hence, in Zambia’s multi-party ‘Third 
Republic’ the President is eligible to one re-election only. This term limit became contested in 2000 
when some quarters in the ruling party MMD – apparently backed by the President – tried to 
amend the constitution in order to allow for a third term of President Chiluba. Only after massive 
public protests was this exercise stopped (Rakner/Svåsand 2005: 97; Rakner 2003: 114). These ma-
noeuvres strengthen the case being made in this article of a neopatrimonial power concentration in 
Zambia.  
9   Key ministers include the Vice-President/Prime Minister and the Ministers of Finance, Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Interior. Under President Kaunda, the average tenure was 2.4 years, under 
President Chiluba 2.7 years and under President Mwanawasa (up to the year 2005) 1.6 years. Due 
to the comparatively short endurance of the Mwanawasa Presidency, the figures give only first in-
dications about big man rule trends in his administration. Sources: 1964-1969: The Statesman’s 
Year-Book (Macmillan 1964-1970), 1970-2005: Africa South of the Sahara (Europa Publications 
1971-2004; Routledge 2005). 10  von Soest: How Does Neopatrimonialism Affect the African State? 
(Tordoff/Molteno 1974: 254) in the key departments has not slowed down under the current 
President Mwanawasa who was re-elected on 28 September 2006 (Electoral Commission of 
Zambia 2006). In sum, the neopatrimonial concentration of political power has been a fea-
ture consistently applied in Zambian politics. 
 
Award of Personal Favours 
Not only do Zambia’s Presidents frequently rotate ministers, they also award personal fa-
vours to other elite members in order to secure their rule. A prime means has been the ex-
pansion of the ministerial cabinet, which features prominently for awarding personal fa-
vours in Africa (van de Walle 2001a: 32-33). The Zambian cabinet has grown significantly 
over the years; from 14 ministers in 1964 to currently 23 members.10 This is congruent with 
the trend in many African countries. Van de Walle shows that the average number of cabi-
net ministers in the region rose from 20.1 members in 1979 to 24.6 in 2000 (2005: 80).11 As in 
Zambia, these cabinet sizes cannot be substantiated with functional necessities. Most devel-
oped countries, having much larger populations and economies, are governed by cabinets of 
only 15 to 20 ministers (OECD 2004: 2). 
The number of core cabinet ministers only moderately reflects the real enlargement of pa-
tronage posts in the Zambian government. In 1968, President Kaunda appointed ministers 
for each of Zambia’s nine provinces. After the introduction of the one-party state, the UNIP 
Central Committee became a parallel structure to the ministerial cabinet (van Donge 1995: 
196). The President also created additional posts in order to pursue his policy of ‘tribal bal-
ancing’ in Zambia’s multi-ethnic society (Carey 2002: 60). Despite Zambia’s severe and en-
during economic crisis, originally caused by the sharply decreasing world-market prices of 
copper in the mid-1970s, the ministerial cabinet went up to a peak of 27 ministers (1986 to 
1988) during the Second Republic. Furthermore, the ‘UNIP patronage machine’ (Bratton 
1994: 104) massively expanded public sector employment. Following Bates and Collier 
(1993: 391), in 1985, the party filled over 40,000 public offices in Zambia’s capital Lusaka 
alone. 
After the transition from the one-party state to multi-party rule and the formation of his 
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) government in 1991, President Chiluba, also 
                                                      
10  Totals include Presidents and Vice-Presidents, but not Deputy Ministers, Permanent Secretaries 
and Provincial Governors. The data on Cabinet size were mostly derived from the months August 
and September of the respective years. Sources: 1964-1969: The Statesman’s Year-Book (Macmillan 
1964-1970), 1970-2005: Africa South of the Sahara (Europa Publications 1971-2004; Routledge 2005). 
11   In assessing the average number of Cabinet members for sub-Saharan Africa, van de Walle sys-
tematically excluded ‘Heads of States’. For comparability to this article’s figures one post was 
added to his average data, respectively. von Soest: How Does Neopatrimonialism Affect the African State?  11 
formed a large cabinet. He appointed 25 ministers to the Third Republic’s first cabinet; a 
number which rose to an all-time high of 28 posts one year later. Even today the bloated 
government is a feature of Zambian politics. A 2004 media campaign to reduce the number 
of high-level government posts has remained unsuccessful (The Post 20.4.2004; The Post 
26.4.2004). According to a Government of Zambia document, the total number of govern-
ment members (President, Vice-President, Ministers and Vice-Ministers) on 3 August 2005 
stood at 67 (Republic of Zambia 2005). In essence, this consistent use of the cabinet as a key 
locus for awarding personal favours by the ‘big men’ augments the argument for the domi-
nance of neopatrimonial practices in Zambian politics. 
 
Misuse of State Resources 
The misuse of state resources12, the third feature of neopatrimonialism, has also character-
ized Zambia’s political practice. It can be assessed through the existence of special funds 
over which only the big man has discretion. The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the 
similar World Bank Governance Index in respect to ‘control of corruption’ provide further 
evidence. Both are composite indices which incorporate various studies on a country’s per-
ceived incidence of corruption (Graf Lambsdorff 2005; Kaufmann et al. 2005a). Similar to 
other research, this article uses the existence of serious corruption levels as an indicator for 
the neopatrimonial misuse of state resources (Manow 2002: 24-25; Basedau 2003: 281-287). 
During the Second Republic, a Leadership Code obliged all cabinet and Central Committee 
members to separate public office and private interests (Kaunda 1972, par. 4). Yet, the text of 
the code was not put into practice. A general pattern emerged of misusing public functions 
and resources.13 It became apparent that ‘bribes and favours offered a host of rewards for 
“gatekeeping’ services”’ (Szeftel 2000: 210). Monitoring institutions such as the Anti-
Corruption Commission remained toothless and the infrequent exposure of government 
malpractices did not counter the systematic misappropriation of public resources (Afronet 
2002: 89; van Donge 1995: 198; Tordoff/Molteno 1974: 287). 
President Chiluba’s government also misused state resources, often to the advantage of the 
ruling party MMD (Erdmann/Simutanyi 2003: 72; Szeftel 2000: 217).14 According to Trans-
                                                      
12   Bratton and van de Walle term this facet ‘use of state resources for political legitimation’. How-
ever, in all political systems governments ‘use’ state resources for securing their acceptance. The 
key difference is how and for what projects public resources are spent. This article therefore refers 
to the phenomenon in question as ‘misuse of state resources’.  
13   Well-researched examples can be found in Szeftel (1982; 2000) and Bratton/Posner (1999: 393-398). 
14   In addition to the general problem of sources, it is difficult to precisely compare the misuse of state 
resources between the Kaunda and the Chiluba administrations as these instances of neopatrimo-
nial politics have been more easily uncovered in the multi-party Third Republic which allows for 12  von Soest: How Does Neopatrimonialism Affect the African State? 
parency International Zambia (TIZ), a number of ministers were involved in corruption 
scandals without being dismissed (TIZ 2002: 35-37; TIZ 2003: 9-10, 13). Furthermore, Zambia 
has from 1998 to 2005 received low scores on Transparency International’s CPI. The country 
always ranked in the worse half, for most of the time in the worst third of countries included 
in the index (Internet Center for Corruption Research 2005). Zambia’s ‘control of corruption’ 
marks in the World Bank Governance Index have equally been low. The country has consis-
tently featured among the third of countries perceived to be most corrupt (Kaufmann et al. 
2005b). 
A similar ‘blurring of the line’ between the governing party and the state took place as in the 
Second Republic (Rakner/Svåsand 2005: 95). Before the 1996 elections, the government sold 
council houses to tenants at favourable conditions. Commentators largely perceived this 
move as an inducement to vote for the MMD (Financial Mail 27.8.-2.9.2002; Bratton/Posner 
1999: 397). In 1999, the government created a ‘Presidential Discretionary Fund’, unofficially 
called ‘Slush Fund’, to distribute favours to clients. The fund’s reserved budgetary alloca-
tions of around 12 billion Kwacha per annum (roughly US$ 5 million at that time), were at 
the disposal of the President alone, who apparently deployed it for partisan purposes 
(Burnell 2001b: 251; Simon 2005: 209).15
In the face of these developments, President Mwanawasa began his tenure on 2 January 2002 
by declaring his administration to be ‘a government of laws not of men’. One of the centre-
pieces of his ‘new deal’ government was the proclaimed fight against corruption (Erdmann/ 
Simutanyi 2003: 78; Simon 2005: 212). He lifted the immunity of former President Chiluba 
and charged him and some of his allies with abuse of office. However, there are strong indi-
cations that President Mwanawasa’s campaign has remained inconsequential and is primar-
ily used as a way of silencing his opponents (TIZ 2002: 30; EIU 2005: 16). The misuse of state 
resources has remained a recurrent feature of Zambian politics. 
On balance, political practice in Zambia since independence in 1964 has been characterised 
by neopatrimonialism. Due to its inherent lack of accountability, the single-party state in the 
Second Republic seems to have reinforced the neopatrimonial impulse (Bratton 1994: 125). 
Yet, it is striking to see the neopatrimonial continuity throughout the Third Republic after 
the abolition of single-party rule. This deeply ingrained system of neopatrimonialism has 
created a hostile environment for a rational-legal tax administration and the collection of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
stronger civil society, media and donor oversight than the Second Republic. The common percep-
tion that misuse of state resources was more rampant under President Chiluba’s rule might there-
fore been an artefact caused by the different quality of sources. 
15   See also Burnell’s (2001a) analysis of the ‘financial indiscipline’ of the Chiluba government and the 
Transparency International Zambia report (TIZ 2003) on the abuse of public funds. Further in-
stances are presented in Rakner/Svåsand (2005: 93-96).  von Soest: How Does Neopatrimonialism Affect the African State?  13 
revenue. The question now to be answered is how this neopatrimonial system has affected 
the revenue-generating function of the Zambian state. 
 
 
4. Neopatrimonialism and the Collection of Revenue 
The institutional development of Zambia’s tax administration is characterised by two 
phases: The first lasted from independence in 1964 to 1994, when the Departments of Taxes 
and of Customs and Excise were integral parts of the state structure. The second began on 1 
April 1994, when the government launched the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA). With this 
semi-autonomous agency, it outsourced the collection of revenue from the traditional, state-
integrated public administration under the direct control of the Ministry of Finance. In ac-
cordance to the discussion of neopatrimonialism above, this article uses two indicators for 
analysing the effect of Zambia’s neopatrimonial system on the tax administration: (a) merit 
orientation of staff and (b) political interventions with the day-to-day administrative work. 
This is followed by the assessment of the tax administration’s revenue performance. The 
indicators will reveal completely different effects of neopatrimonialism on the two institu-
tional dispensations. 
 
Zambia’s Tax Administration As Part of the State Structure 
After independence, the Zambian government faced the objective need to enlarge and 
strengthen the inadequate tax administration apparatus inherited from colonial rule. In its 
first report, the Department of Taxes noted that the government had authorised 141 posts 
from which 127 were filled. The Department dealt with only 6,493 taxpayers at that time 
(DTZ 1969: 8). In accordance to the rest of the civil service, President Kaunda’s UNIP gov-
ernment massively expanded the Departments of Taxes and of Customs and Excise. The 
number of staff of the Department of Customs and Excise for instance quickly rose from 280 
in the year 1964 to 629 in 1967 (DCEZ 1966: 1). 
However, available evidence paints the picture of an increasingly ailing administration. 
With the introduction of the one-party state in December 1972, Zambia’s administrative 
structure lost most of its operational autonomy and had to predominately follow a political 
logic. Goldsmith (1999: 544) regards this as a general pattern for sub-Saharan Africa: ‘Politi-
cal interference and low standards set the wrong tone at the beginning and interacted later 
with poor working conditions and low pay in a classic vicious circle.’ 
Political and neopatrimonial considerations significantly reduced the merit orientation of 
Zambian tax officers. In 1968, two years after independence, a Zambian took over the post of 14  von Soest: How Does Neopatrimonialism Affect the African State? 
the Controller of Customs and Excise from a British administrator, with the Department of 
Taxes following two years later. The heads of both Departments were appointees with con-
nections to the ruling party UNIP. According to a long-serving tax officer, this form of se-
lecting the tax administration’s leadership was widely resented among tax officers. They 
saw the managers as unqualified ‘outsiders’ (14.4.2004, int.). Although technical qualifica-
tions were not completely disregarded as a recruitment criterion, the apparently best-suited 
candidates did not fill the tax administration’s leadership positions.16
Working for the tax administration was very unattractive as the salary levels were low and 
the employment conditions poor. By 1991, the real remuneration for most public sector 
groups had declined to only 11-22% of its 1975 value (World Bank 2003: 114). The funda-
mental reason could be found in Zambia’s severe economic and fiscal crisis, which restricted 
the state’s ability to remunerate its numerous civil servants properly. A second reason was 
that, as in many African countries, high inflation rates eroded more than 80% of the purchas-
ing power of civil servants (van de Walle 2005: 78). According to an annual report from the 
Department of Taxes, trained tax officers ‘tend to leave for greener pastures largely because 
they can be much better remunerated elsewhere or they stand better chances of promotion 
in other Government organs and hence get higher pay’ (DTZ 1987: 9). 
The recruitment, promotion and remuneration policies of Zambia’s tax administration devi-
ated considerably from the Weberian concept of public administration. This deficient merit 
orientation of tax administration managers and tax officers shows that Zambia’s pressing 
need for new sources of revenue did not translate into the government strengthening the tax 
administration and increasingly collecting taxes from citizens and companies. 
The logic of neopatrimonialism was also felt in the day-to-day business of doing tax assess-
ments and evaluating customs duties. According to a former tax officer, ‘some people had 
better treatment, the big shots. It depended on who you are’ (14.4.2004, int.). This assertion is 
also valid for the Department of Customs and Excise. In his 1979 annual report, the Head of 
the Department openly articulated his frustration: ‘The number of senior people in the Party 
and its Government who apparently feel they have immunity to Customs formalities con-
tinued to soar […] Officers are now working under constant fear of being victimised if they 
stumble across these officials’ (DCEZ 1983: 6). The regular occurrence of these interventions 
was confirmed by nearly all of the 75 respondents, i.e. tax officers, business persons, civil 
society representatives, policy makers, social scientists and employees from international 
                                                      
16   This mix of partly adhering to qualifications in a rational-legal sense and of patrimonial and politi-
cal logics involved in filling management positions gives evidence for the existence neopatrimoni-
alism understood as the simultaneous operation of a patrimonial and rational-legal logic in the tax 
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organisations, who were interviewed for this study and who had knowledge on Zambia’s 
old, state-integrated tax administration. 
This neopatrimonial interference exerted strong effects on the tax administration’s revenue 
performance. In the beginning of the 1970s, tax revenue amounted to about 30% of GDP, a 
value that was predominately caused by the high copper price on the world markets 
(Coopers & Lybrand 1992: par. 1). Since 1975, however, it more than halved and in 1993, the 
year before the introduction of the semi-autonomous Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA), it 
amounted to only 15.3% (World Bank 2003: 15). 
This could not only be attributed to Zambia’s economic crisis. A significant proportion of the 
potential tax take remained uncollected. In 1992, the Minister of Finance stated that the tax 
administration only tapped on one third of formal sector incomes (Republic of Zambia 1992: 
19). The Department of Taxes never managed to significantly broaden the tax base and the 
government refrained from capturing ‘difficult’ taxpayer groups with intimate connections 
to the ruling elite. Self-employed individuals such as physicians and lawyers remained 
largely outside the tax net (DTZ 1976: 4). 
Drawing on international aid was less ‘costly’ for the UNIP government than taxing its citi-
zens. From 1975 to the present day, Zambia has received large amounts of foreign donor 
assistance, both in absolute terms and relative to its GDP. Up to 2001, donors in toto pro-
vided more than US$ 12 billion of financial assistance to Zambia which was equivalent to 
almost 20% of GDP (World Bank Africa Database 2005; McPherson 2004b: 446). 
In April 2005, the IMF and the World Bank under their initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) formally endorsed a US$ 3.9 billion debt relief for Zambia (IMF 2005a). 
Following the June 2005 commitment of developed countries to write off bilateral debt, the 
Minister of Finance and National Planning expected Zambia’s foreign debt to decline to US$ 
300-500 million by May 2006 (The Post 3.1.2006). However, despite strong dependence on 
external financing, structural conditions attached to loans were not implemented. During 
the two decades of one-party rule, the UNIP government failed to meet the conditions of 
seven formal adjustment programmes negotiated with international donors (McPherson 
2004a: 31). 
Neopatrimonial interference with the recruitment of staff and with the day-to-day opera-
tions were major factors causing the deficits of Zambia’s tax administration during the Sec-
ond Republic. Despite President Kaunda’s statements to the contrary, not every citizen, i.e. 
taxpayer, was treated equally. Neopatrimonialism directly trickled down to the tax admini-
stration and reduced its performance. As a result, the weak revenue collection authorities 
inherited from colonial rule, became largely dysfunctional during the Second Republic. 
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Reform amidst Zambia’s Neopatrimonial Environment 
The effect of neopatrimonialism on the tax collection completely changed after the regime 
transition in late 1991. The newly-elected MMD government not only swiftly liberalised 
Zambia’s fiscal and economic policy (e.g. Rakner 2003; Craig 2001) but also negotiated new 
loan agreements with the donor community. In the face of the experiences in the 1980s, the 
IMF on its part added the strengthening of internal revenue collection to its conditionalities 
for the provision of new loans (Hill 2004: 141; Gloppen/Rakner 2002: 32). This proved to be 
of crucial importance, as the route of de facto unconditionally financing the state through 
external funds was now closed. Reform of the tax collection was inevitable for the strength-
ening of both internal and external state revenues. 
In 1992, the British government funded initial studies, which recommended the establish-
ment of a semi-autonomous revenue authority (Coopers & Lybrand 1992; Gray et al. 2001).17 
The arguments for taking the revenue generation out of Zambia’s core state structure were 
two-fold. The first was to increase revenue performance through the business-like collection 
of taxes (see in general Devas et al. 2001). The second reason was to insulate the tax admini-
stration from Zambia’s neopatrimonial environment, i.e. from political interference (Tax 
Policy Task Force 1992: 4). 
The Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA), replacing the ministerial Departments of Taxes and 
Customs and Excise started to operate on 1 April 1994. Its executive Commissioner General 
is appointed by the Zambian President and alone is responsible for the collection of revenue. 
He or she reports to a nine-member Governing Board and not to the Ministry of Finance and 
National Planning (Republic of Zambia 1996: sec. 10 (1), (3)). 
The creation of the ZRA not only was a precondition for further donor support but was also 
in the interest of the new Zambian government. The revenue authority, as other institutional 
innovations created in the ‘honeymoon period’ of the Chiluba government, acted as a force-
ful symbol of its commitment to turn Zambia’s public administration around. The address-
ees of this visible ‘reform barometer’ were both the Zambian population and the donor 
community.18 As will be shown, this institutional restructuring has reduced the effect of 
neopatrimonialism on the collection of revenue in Zambia but at the same time has been 
consistent with a neopatrimonial rationale. 
                                                      
17   The conceptual impetus was provided by the paradigm of New Public Management which pro-
motes the creation of semi-autonomous agencies and the application of business-sector principles 
such as performance-related salaries for the public administration (Hood 1990). The worldwide 
diffusion of New Public Management has been of increasing relevance to the African state. Today, 
at least eight revenue authorities can be found in sub-Saharan Africa (Devas et al. 2001: 213).  
18   For a general analysis of the Zambian government’s two-level game between internal and external 
actors during the Third Republic see Rakner (2003: esp. 174-189). von Soest: How Does Neopatrimonialism Affect the African State?  17 
Strong Expatriate Management and Merit Orientation of Staff 
The ZRA has been a reform project closely monitored by donors. Until 2004, the British De-
partment for International Development (DFID) provided technical assistance worth £15.8 
million to the project.19 The most prominent aspect was the provision of an expatriate man-
agement team for the ZRA. In the beginning, none of the authority’s four most senior man-
agers was Zambian. Three Commissioners, including the Commissioner General, were from 
the United Kingdom and one from Tanzania. 
Foreign personnel was thought to be less integrated into local social networks and less re-
sponsive to Zambia’s neopatrimonial environment (Kasanga 1996: 21; Delay et al. 1999: 23; 
Gray/Chapman 2001: 40). According to the long-serving Economic Advisor to President Chi-
luba, ‘it was a deliberate policy to have top managers paid by DFID. It was a very important 
influence to de-link Commissioners from local politics’ (22.4.2004, int.). Their task was to 
instil a new sense of professionalism in Zambia’s tax administration. Only in February 2002, 
almost nine years after the creation of the tax agency, the expatriate Commissioner General 
as the last manager from abroad left and was followed by a Zambian. The donors’ strategy 
therefore was to insulate the revenue authority from its neopatrimonial environment by 
bringing in foreign managers. 
The ZRA’s local managers maintain close connections to the political sphere 
(Gloppen/Rakner 2002: 34). The intimate exchange became obvious when a dismissed 
Commissioner of Customs directly appealed to the President and was reinstated following 
pressure from the Presidency (Times of Zambia 20.5.2004; Times of Zambia 25.5.2004). Al-
though politicians do not openly interfere with the recruitment process as seems to be the 
case in other countries’ revenue authorities (for Uganda see Therkildsen 2004: 73), a high 
number of ZRA employees feel that politics are involved in the appointment of senior man-
agers. Even one member of the ZRA’s Governing Board consented that ‘a lot of them have 
access to politicians’ (26.5.2004, int.). However, the ZRA has brought a significant increase in 
the qualification of tax administration managers. The neopatrimonial environment today 
exerts less influence on them than under the old dispensation. 
The lack of merit orientation among low level and middle level staff had been one of the 
main deficits of the former tax administration Departments. In contrast, the ZRA pursues its 
own recruitment policy for tax officers, thereby circumventing the Public Service Commis-
                                                      
19   In 1994, the responsible British Ministry was named ‘Overseas Development Administration’; 
since 1997 it operates under the name ‘Department for International Development’ (DFID). The 
scope of the DFID intervention expanded considerably beyond a mere support of the ZRA. Since 
2000, the DFID has also supported the Tax Policy Unit within Zambia’s Ministry of Finance and 
National Planning and has assisted local NGOs to build knowledge on taxation issues. Therefore, 
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sion which is responsible for the rest of Zambia’s civil service (see in general Devas et al. 
2001: 214). Before the revenue authority was launched, every civil servant had to reapply in 
order to be employed by the new institution. The revenue authority only took over the best-
qualified officers which had not been involved in corrupt activities. 
Later, the management introduced minimum qualifications, meaning that every middle-
level tax officer must hold a diploma or a higher degree from university. This entrance bar-
rier has been of crucial importance for the ZRA’s merit orientation: Managers can ‘hide be-
hind’20 it and so resist the recruitment of unqualified staff due to neopatrimonial pressures. 
Accordingly, ZRA employees and external respondents overwhelmingly perceived the re-
cruitment process for low and middle level tax officers to be transparent and fair. This gen-
eral perception was mirrored by respondents from outside Zambia’s tax administration. 
Furthermore, a high-level remuneration scheme makes employment at the revenue author-
ity very attractive. On its inception, the ZRA paid tax officers on average two- or three-fold 
the salary they had received in government. A middle ranking officer in 1994 earned Kwa-
cha 49,000 per month and after 1 April 1994, the launch of the ZRA, the same employee was 
paid K140,000.21 Additionally, the authority provides substantial allowances and benefits. 
Tax officers today belong to the best-paid employees in Zambia and – together with the cen-
tral bank’s staff – form the administrative elite of the country. 
It is one of the revenue authority’s biggest achievements, that it has largely de-linked the 
employment of administrative staff from Zambia’s neopatrimonial environment. The 75 
interviews with respondents from inside and outside the ZRA provide strong indications 
that the merit orientation of tax officers has improved considerably. This is despite the fact 
that Zambia’s political actors have continuously made use of neopatrimonial practices. The 
prime actors setting the ZRA’s foundations were, however, expatriate and not local manag-
ers. In this regard, the revenue authority for a long time was an ‘exterritorial’ organisation. 
 
                                                      
20   This term was chosen by a former Commissioner General interviewed for this article.  
21   Today, the difference in some areas is even bigger. A young graduate in the Tax Policy Unit of the 
Ministry of Finance and National Planning earns K890,000 per month (equivalent to roughly US$ 
190), whereas his or her counterpart in the ZRA’s Executive Support Unit is paid around 
K7,000,000 (roughly US$ 1500) as a monthly salary (in 2004 prices; information from ZRA). The 
ZRA salary for this position therefore is approximately eight times higher than in the public sector. 
For Tanzania, Fjeldstad (2002: 8) reports that the remuneration for some staff categories was up to 
ten times higher than the one from corresponding positions in the traditional public administra-
tion. von Soest: How Does Neopatrimonialism Affect the African State?  19 
Restricted Interference with Day-to-day Business 
Despite donor surveillance and general government support, it appears that in various in-
stances taxpayers have received preferential treatment whereas others have been harassed.22 
This indicates some neopatrimonial influence on the ZRA’s day-to-day business of assessing 
tax liabilities. 
At least in the beginning, prominent MMD politicians and their businesses were not con-
trolled through tax audits (Kasanga 1996: 23). A common phrase employees heard from 
their managers in these cases was ‘don’t go to this man, this man is difficult’. Respondents 
mentioned several politician-owned companies which allegedly have never paid tax. Fur-
thermore, the ZRA was apparently told not to control ‘special’ government members for 
dutiable goods at border posts. 
On the other hand, the Chiluba government used arbitrary tax auditing and fines as a means 
of pursuing an ‘almost irrational behaviour […] towards outspoken NGOs’ (Erdmann/ 
Simutanyi 2003: 42). For example, in 2003 it set bailiffs on the organisation Afronet for tax 
evasion. Seven cars and other property were sized (Erdmann/Simutanyi 2003: 57). One 
prominent member of the Zambian NGO Forum for Democratic Process (FODEP) reported a 
similar incident. According to him, the organisation did not have any tax arrears, which 
makes this measure arbitrary (26.4.2004, int.). It was only following donor pressure that 
seized FODEP money was released. 
This suggests that taxation in the Third Republic in some cases has been used for harass-
ment of opponents or for the provision of unlawful benefits to government members. Af-
firmed by a former Commissioner General, he indeed sometimes reported to the British 
Ambassador or the local IMF Representative in order to protect the interests of the ZRA vis-
à-vis the Zambian government. In general, however, Zambia’s government has limited un-
due influence on the revenue authority’s day-to-day business compared to its predecessor 
institutions. Affirmed by most respondents, even from civil society, instances of positive or 
negative discrimination have at least in the recent years not been of a systemic nature. 
 
Increased but Stagnating Revenue Performance 
The restriction of neopatrimonial interference has resulted in improved revenue perform-
ance. The tax-to-GDP ratio went up sharply from 15.3 to 18.7% in the first year of ZRA’s op-
eration (World Bank 2003: 15), total revenue collected increased by 61% (Kasanga 1996: 17). 
                                                      
22   There was no other question on which respondents gave such disparate answers. While the ZRA 
management claimed that there is no political interference, some employees on the low/middle 
level as well as NGO representatives strongly maintained that there has been selective application 
of the tax code in Zambia. 20  von Soest: How Does Neopatrimonialism Affect the African State? 
In the following years, the tax take has largely remained stagnant. This stagnation could be 
attributed to tax policy changes, tax exemptions and Zambia’s unfavourable economic de-
velopment (Gray et al. 2001: 21-23; Hill 2004: 137). The major factors depressing the tax-to-
GDP ratio therefore lay beyond the revenue authority’s influence. Yet since 2000 Zambia’s 
economy has grown by 4.4% on average (IMF 2005b: 55) with no increase in the tax-to-GDP 
ratio, indicating that the ZRA has not been able to participate in the expanding economy. 
This initial upward movement in revenue performance followed by stagnation or even de-
cline has been a characteristic feature of semi-autonomous revenue authorities in Africa 
(Fjeldstad/Rakner 2003: 17; Gray/Chapman 2001: 26). 
At least in the Zambian case, this can primarily be attributed to the small tax base the ZRA 
collects from. The authority has largely desisted from the administratively (and politically) 
demanding task of expanding direct taxation. As affirmed by a DFID-study, the ZRA’s im-
pact on direct tax collection has remained ‘modest’ (Gray et al. 2001: 12). Income tax collec-
tion never amounted to more than eight per cent of GDP – not even in the most recent years 
with comparatively strong economic growth (IMF 2006: 35). With formal sector employment 
accounting for less than 20% of Zambia’s economically active population (Central Statistical 
Office 1999: 40), the burden of income tax centres on the few individuals working for regis-
tered companies and the public service. Despite the remarkable initial improvement of 
revenue performance, this focus on easily accessible taxpayers inherently restricts the scope 
for increased revenue collection in Zambia. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
The analysis of neopatrimonialism and the collection of revenue in Zambia provides an-
swers to two basic questions: What are neopatrimonialism’s consequences for financing the 
African state? And, secondly, what do this study’s results mean for the empirical applicabil-
ity of the neopatrimonialism concept? 
The three features ‘concentration of political power’, ‘award of personal favours’ and ‘mis-
use of state resources’ reveal a striking continuity of neopatrimonial practice despite Zam-
bia’s regime transition in 1991. They confirm that constitutional change affects neopatrimo-
nialism ‘very little’ (Szeftel 2000: 221). However, despite this neopatrimonial stability, the 
semi-autonomous ZRA has brought a significant increase in revenue performance. With 
around 18% of GDP a larger part of state revenue today comes from domestic sources than 
under the old administrative structure. This changing performance indicates that there is no 
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tation that neopatrimonialism necessarily diminishes revenue of the African state is not sub-
stantiated by this study. 
In other areas of the state, Zambia’s political actors pursue neopatrimonial exchange rela-
tions largely unabated. Government members still seem to satisfy particularistic demands 
through the expenditure side of the budget. Donor reports have repeatedly criticised the 
lack of budget discipline and the continued misuse of state resources (World Bank 2003; 
World Bank 2004; see also Burnell 2001a). One example is the regular authorisation of ‘sup-
plementary appropriations’ for the Ministries of Home Affairs, Defence, Foreign Affairs, 
Finance and Labour. Under Zambia’s budget regulations, these expenses are determined by 
the executive, with the Ministry of Finance and National Planning having up to 15 months 
after the end of the fiscal year to table the supplementary appropriations bill before parlia-
ment (World Bank 2003: 28-30). This practice creates much leeway for the government to 
appropriate funds for particularistic use without parliamentary oversight. 
The specific effects of Zambia’s neopatrimonialism on the collection of domestic state reve-
nue have changed, but neopatrimonialism has not vanished. It could even be possible that 
the strengthened revenue generation provides additional funds for neopatrimonial prac-
tices, i.e. have even increased them on the whole. This reasoning fits well into other litera-
ture hypothesising that ‘new, relatively powerful Revenue Authorities that aid donors have 
been helping to establish in Africa have become major conduits for accumulating and chan-
nelling unrecorded revenues in wrong hands’ (Moore/Rakner 2002: 7). The reform of the tax 
administration in Zambia hence appears to be a typical example of the ‘partial reform syn-
drome’ (for Africa see van de Walle 2001b: 60-63; for Zambia Rakner 2003: 168), meaning 
that political leaders only carry out reforms which do not hurt their vested interests. 
Although it is not possible to directly infer revenue performance from the neopatrimonial 
profile, the three indicators used in this article allow for systematic assessment of the domi-
nating political practice in Zambia and, in turn, the political environment the tax administra-
tion has to deal with. For moving analysis forward, the three features ‘concentration of po-
litical power’, ‘award of personal favours’, and ‘misuse of state resources’ can form the basis 
of comparatively assessing neopatrimonial practices in various African states. This would 
serve to systematically establish differences and commonalities of neopatrimonialism on the 
continent. 
However, despite being an independent variable of crucial importance, the question about 
the effect of the ‘elusive’ practice of neopatrimonialism is too general and, in turn, not falsifi-
able (see Therkildsen for a similar argument, 2005: 48-50). It is determined by the interde-
pendence with other variables, with donor influence being the most important in this case. 
The donors’ strategy has been to diminish the influence of Zambia’s neopatrimonial envi-22  von Soest: How Does Neopatrimonialism Affect the African State? 
ronment through outright political pressure and – most prominently on the administrative 
level – through the provision of an expatriate management team. This result contributes to 
the emerging consensus that variables in addition to neopatrimonialism are needed in order 
to adequately assess political practice and its effects in sub-Saharan Africa (Abbink 2006: 
196; Therkildsen 2005: 49; Kjaer 2004: 407-408). Future empirical research applying the 
neopatrimonialism paradigm should take this basic caveat into account. von Soest: How Does Neopatrimonialism Affect the African State?  23 
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